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QKD: a million signal task
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Abstract. I review the ideas and main results in the derivation of security bounds
in quantum key distribution for keys of finite length. In particular, all the detailed
studies on specific protocols and implementations indicate that no secret key can
be extracted if the number of processed signals per run is smaller than 105 − 106 .
I show how these numbers can be recovered from very basic estimates.
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1. Introduction
In the very first proof of unconditional security of quantum key distribution (QKD),
Mayers already stressed the need to obtain finite-key bounds and paved the path for this
task [1]. The complex development of QKD, which has been reviewed elsewhere [2],
explains why this task was finally achieved only recently.
This text is a concise presentation of finite-key security proofs, written for readers
that are already familiar with the main notions of QKD. I use the approach developed
by Renato Renner in his thesis [3] and applied later to the specific study of finite-key
effects [4,5,6]. Independently, and actually some months earlier than Renner and myself,
Hayashi has also developed finite-key analysis [7,8,9]. A recent work by Fung, Ma and
Chau tackles the problem from yet another approach [10]. It must be stressed that all
these approaches are recognized to be ultimately based on the same definition of security
and lead to the same order of magnitude for the finite-key corrections, although there
may be differences in details.
2. Finite-key corrections
In a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob have to infer the information that could have leaked
to the eavesdropper Eve on the basis of some measured parameters: error rates, detection
rates, and others. These parameters and the way of measuring them define the protocol.
Let us refer to them asV measured value of the parameters.
Let N be total number of signals exchanged by Alice and Bob in a run of key ex-
change, n the number of signals kept for the key (i.e. the length of the raw key) and m
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the number of signals used for parameter estimation. The length of the secret key to be
extracted is denoted by ℓ. The usually quoted number is the secret key fraction r = ℓ
N
.
It is important to note from the start that a run of key exchange is defined as the
number of signals that shall be processed together: obviously, the duration of the key
exchange cannot increase its security. In all this text, I focus on one-way post-processing
without pre-processing, so specifically a run is defined by the size of the blocks on which
privacy amplification is performed.
In the asymptotic limit, the expression of r is by now well-known:
r∞ = lim
N→∞
ℓ
N
= min
E|V
H(A|E)−H(A|B) (1)
It has an intuitive meaning: the fraction that can be extracted is the uncertainty of Eve
minus the uncertainty of Bob (or equivalently, the information of Bob minus the infor-
mation of Eve) on Alice’s key.
The finite-key bound, to be proved below, reads
rN =
ℓ
N
=
n
N
[
min
E|V±∆V
H(A|E)−∆(n)− leakEC/n
]
. (2)
Four differences between (1) and (2) are worth stressing:
1. n
N
: in the asymptotic case, the protocol can be adapted so that almost all the sig-
nals are used for the raw key and only a negligible fraction is used for parameter
estimation [11]. This is of course no longer the case in the finite-key regime: one
needs to devote enough many signals to parameter estimation in order to have
good statistics.
2. V ± ∆V : the statistical estimates of the parameters come with fluctuations for
finite sampling.
3. leakEC : this is the information that leaks out to Eve during error correction; in
the asymptotic case, it is given by the Shannon bound H(A|B), but for practical
codes on finite samples the Shannon bound may not be reached.
4. ∆(n): while the three previous items are pretty obvious and and had in fact been
anticipated in many works, both theoretical and experimental, this term is the
challenging one. It comes as an overhead to privacy amplification: the task itself
cannot be carried out perfectly on finite samples.
In summary, the theoretical challenge of finite-key analysis mainly consists of obtaining
an expression for ∆(n). As we shall show, once this expression is obtained, one can
study which of the corrections has the largest effect; it will turn out that the most dra-
matic correction comes from the “obvious” need to take into account ∆V , the statistical
fluctuations in the estimate of the parameters.
3. Derivation of the finite-key bound
3.1. Scenario
The following equation summarizes the steps of a QKD exchange:
Φ⊗NAB
Eve
−→ ΨANBNE
Meas.
−→
∑
a,b∈{0,1}n
p(a, b)|a〉〈a| ⊗ |b〉〈b| ⊗ ρ
a,b
E and parametersV
EC
−→
∑
a∈{0,1}n
p(a)|a〉〈a| ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ ρ
a
E
PA(V)
−→
( ∑
k∈{0,1}ℓ
1
2ℓ
|k〉〈k| ⊗ |k〉〈k|
)
⊗ ρE ≡ ρU ⊗ ρE .
In words: on the quantum channel, Eve interacts with the N signals flying between
Alice and Bob; by giving Eve a purification of the whole state, we give her the max-
imal possible information. When Alice and Bob measure, the total state becomes a
classical-classical-quantum (ccq) state. After error correction (EC), Alice’s and Bob’s
classical lists are equal, but Eve has gained some additional classical information:
ρ
a
E =
∑
b p(b|a)ρ
a,b
E ⊗|C(b→ a)〉〈C(b→ a)|. After privacy amplification (PA), the lists
of Alice and Bob are shorter, but still equal and now drawn from a completely random
distribution, on which Eve has no information.
This is for the ideal case. In order to estimate ℓ, the first step consists in defining a
security parameter. The most convenient choice, actually the only one with the suitable
properties known to date (see [4] for a discussion), is the probability that the processed
state differs from the ideal one:
ǫ =
1
2
Tr |ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE | . (3)
So, now we choose a value for ǫ (say 10−9, i.e. I want at most one run in one billion to
go wrong), our data processing defines N : how to get the corresponding ℓ? This is the
subject of the next paragraph.
3.2. Renner’s version of Murphy’s law
The recipe is: quantify everything that can go wrong, going backwards, i.e. starting from
PA and going up to parameter estimation. Here is what it gives in detail:
1. First step: Privacy amplification. The probability that PA fails even if everything
has been perfectly carried out is
ǫPA = 2
− 1
2
(Hǫ¯min(An|E)−ℓ) . (4)
As usual, for the proof and the exact definitions I refer to the original papers
quoted above. Let us however get an intuition of this result. The symbol E repre-
sent all that Eve has learned, both from attacking the quantum channel and from
listening to error correction. Alice’s information is denoted by An to remind that
it is a sequence of n bits. The main object introduced here is H ǫ¯min(.|.) is the
quantum conditional smooth min-entropy, with ǫ¯ the smoothing parameter. It is
not astonishing that a min-entropy appears here: as we said above, the final key
should be randomly distributed given Eve’s knowledge. In classical information
theory, the min-entropy precisely quantifies the fraction of completely random
bits one can extract from a given list of partially random bits. The challenge con-
sisted in defining the quantity that plays the same role, in the case where an ad-
versary has quantum information. This was done in Renner’s thesis [3]. So, in a
sense, (4) can be seen as a definition of smooth min-entropy, or better, as one of
the desiderata: the smooth min-entropy must be such that (4) holds.
Now, for the right-hand side of (4) to be bounded, one must have
ℓ ≤ Hmin(A
n|E)− 2 log
1
ǫPA
. (5)
It is crucial to understand that this is already the desired bound for ℓ. Unfortu-
nately, there is no easy way of computing Hmin(An|E): the next steps will be
merely bound on this last quantity, reaching to an ultimately computable expres-
sion.
2. Second step: error correction. First, we have to add an ǫEC to the failure proba-
bility ǫ. This measures the probability that the EC procedure was apparently suc-
cessful but some uncorrected errors remain2. Moreover, as we said, during EC,
additional data C has been provided to Eve, giving an amount of information
leakEC ; by using a chain rule, one can split this information from the one ac-
quired in attacking the quantum channel, denoted by E. So we obtain the expres-
sion
Hmin(A
n|E) =Hmin(A
n|E)− leakEC . (6)
Theory predicts leakEC ≈ fH0(An|Bn)+log 2ǫEC , but ultimately this is number
of bits really exchanged during EC: it does not need theoretical modeling (unless
one is working on designing a better EC code), just pick it from the real run of
the EC code.
3. Third step: Eve’s attack on the quantum channel. Now we are back at the
level of quantum interaction and we have to compute Hmin(An|E): how much
information Eve might have acquired, given the observed disturbances V. Under
the assumption of collective attacks, one finds
Hmin(A
n|E = En) ≤ n
[
H(A|E)− 7
√
log(2/ǫ¯)
n
]
. (7)
The assumption of collective attacks is not restrictive for the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol and many others, under the validity of the squashing con-
dition3. In order to remove this assumption, one could resort to the suitable De
Finetti theorem, but the bound scales very badly. A much more promising ap-
proach is based on Ref. [14], but to my knowledge it has not been applied yet in
the context of finite-keys.
4. Fourth step: Optimize over Eve’s attacks. Since we don’t know which attack
Eve has actually performed, H(A|E) must be computed for the best possible
attack compatible with the measured parameters V. But these parameters have
2This may sound cumbersome at first reading, but it is actually clear. Any EC procedure has a possible red-
flag outcome: “Sorry, the procedure was not successful”. In this case, one just discards the raw key, without
compromising the security. Problems arise only when there are still uncorrected errors left but the red flag is
not raised.
3This condition means that one can prove the security of a protocol on the level of qubits, even if physically
light fields are infinitely dimensional systems. In other words, one can “squash” the meaningful degrees of
freedom down to qubits. This statement has been rigorously proved for the BB84 protocol [12,13].
been measured on a finite sample: they are subject to fluctuations∆V. Specifi-
cally, if a value Vm has been obtained after averaging on m samples, one has4
∆V =
√
ln(1/ǫPE) + d ln(m+ 1)
2m
. (8)
with ǫPE the probability that the fluctuation is actually larger than ∆V and d the
minimal number of outcomes of the POVM that is used to estimate V (typically,
d = 2 for errors on bits: one has to estimate the probabilities of the event “bits
equal” and of the event “bits different”).
Putting everything together, one obtains (2) with
∆(n) =
2
n
log
1
ǫPA
+ 7
√
log(2/ǫ¯)
n
. (9)
Since failure probabilities add, the total error is
ǫ = ǫPA + ǫ¯+ nPEǫPE + ǫEC (10)
with nPE the number of parameters to be estimated.
This concludes our overview of the meaning and derivation of the finite-key bound
(2). As we mentioned, there are alternative approaches [7,8,9,10]: as they stand, these
approaches are specifically tailored for the BB84 protocol; but there is no reason to doubt
that they can be adapted to other protocols as well.
4. Rapid estimates of finite key effects
To date, the bound (2) has been applied to the BB84 protocol, both in the ideal single
photon case [4] and in more realistic scenarios [6], as well as to ideal implementations of
the six-state protocol [4] and of a modified Ekert protocol [5]. In spite of the differences
and for a wide range of reasonable values of parameters, a common feature is observed:
rN becomes larger than 0 only forN ≈ 105−106. Here, we show with a simple estimate
that this is indeed the case.
We suppose that all epsilons are of the order 10−3 ≈ 2−10. This is quite a poor
requirement: it means that the key exchange may fail once every thousand runs only;
but anyway, one would only get a small overhead by choosing 10−9 instead, because the
dependence in the epsilons is logarithmic.
Another useful approximation ism ≈ n ≈ N/2. Close to the critical point where rN
passes from being 0 to be positive, this is always observed in exact numerical estimates
of (2), and it is quite reasonable: in the critical regime, one tries to devote enough many
signals to the parameter estimation, without compromising the key.
Under these two assumption, we have the following approximate values for (9) and
(8) respectively:
∆(n) ≈
40
N
+ 7
√
12
N
, ∆V ≈
√
9 + 2 ln(N)
N
. (11)
4Note added: the following equation is imprecise for d > 2: see a better discussion in L. Sheridan and V.
Scarani, Phys. Rev. A 82, 030301(R) (2010).
Let’s consider two case studies:
1. Case study: effect of ∆(n). Suppose we are in a regime of parameters such
that r∞ = 0.1. Neglecting the parameter fluctuations ∆V , from (2) one has
rN ≈ r∞−∆(n). This quantity is positive for N ≈ 105. Of course, the estimate
becomes worse, the smaller r∞ is (for instance, as a function of the distance in
a practical implementation). In summary, the finite-sample corrections to privacy
amplification force a lower bound of N ≈ 105 signals per run.
2. Case study: effect of ∆V . Consider V as the most typical parameter in QKD,
namely an error rate. Because of the quality of optical setups, errors normally
range around 1− 2%. At which point rN is zero depends on many variables and
of course on the protocol, so we cannot be very specific here. But if one requests
that error rates are known to a precision∆V ≈ 0.5%, one needsN ≈ 106 signals
per run.
From these case studies, we see how the estimate N > 105 − 106 arise from quite
trivial estimates of the finite-key effects, independently of the details of the protocols.
5. Conclusion
Claims of security of QKD could not be complete without integrating the effects of finite
sampling, or finite-key in short. Thanks to the work of several authors, this task has now
been accomplished. One of the most striking features is the fact that, to have any final
key whatsoever, approximately one million signals must be processed in each run — and
the more, the better. In this text, after reviewing the main ingredients of the finite-key
bounds, I have stressed that the lower bounds on the number of signals can be obtained
from very simple estimates and are therefore rather robust. While the performances of
QKD may still be improved in many aspects, it seems unavoidable that QKD will always
be a million-signal task; or, to put it more positively, I would consider it as a milestone
if someone could find a way of improving significantly on these bounds.
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